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Minimum Wages and Low-Wage Workers: 
How Well Does Reality Match the 
Rhetoric?  
David Neumark and William Wascher† 
The minimum wage has long been a fixture of U.S. labor 
market policy.1 The federal minimum, which was introduced in 
1938 as part of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),2 is cur-
rently set at $5.85 per hour and is scheduled to rise to $7.25 per 
hour by 2009.3 According to the U.S. Department of Labor, the 
FLSA covers more than 130 million U.S. workers,4 although 
most are paid above the federal minimum wage.5 In addition, 
most states have their own minimum wage laws, which some-
times specify a minimum wage and typically extend coverage to 
workers exempt for the federal law.6  
 
†  University of California at Irvine and Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System, respectively. The views expressed here are those of the 
authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Board. 
Copyright © 2008 by David Neumark and William Wascher. 
 1. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 
1060 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). 
 2. Id. 
 3. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET #14: COVERAGE UNDER THE FAIR 
LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA) (2007), http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/compliance/ 
whd/whdfs14.pdf. 
 4. Id. 
 5. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, only 2.2% of hourly work-
ers were paid at or below the federal minimum wage in 2006. BUREAU OF 
LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, CHARACTERISTICS OF MINIMUM 
WAGE WORKERS: 2006, http://www.bls.gov/cps/minwage2006tbls.htm#1 (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2008).  
 6. See U.S DEP’T OF LABOR, MINIMUM WAGE LAWS IN THE STATES—
JANUARY 1, 2008, http://www.dol.gov/esa/minwage/printpage.asp?REF= 
america.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2008). A few municipalities also have mini-
mum wage laws and more than one hundred other cities have established  
narrowly defined “living wage” laws. See LIVING WAGE RESOURCE CTR.,  
LIVING WAGE SUCCESSES: A COMPILATION OF LIVING WAGE POLICIES ON THE 
BOOKS, http://www.livingwagecampaign.org/index.php?id=1958 (last visited 
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Despite their widespread application, minimum wages re-
main controversial among economists and policymakers. Many 
supporters point to the potential benefits of minimum wages; 
for example, they claim that minimum wages increase the in-
comes of the poor and ensure a fair and decent wage to low-
skilled workers who have insufficient bargaining power to at-
tain such a wage on their own.7 In contrast, minimum wage op-
ponents emphasize the potential adverse effects of minimum 
wages on labor market opportunities for low-skilled workers, 
and some argue that minimum wages may harm the aggregate 
economy.8 
This Article surveys the available evidence to assess how 
the economic effects of minimum wages match the rhetoric that 
minimum wage proponents and opponents have espoused. For 
example, do minimum wages lead to substantial job losses and 
increases in prices, as opponents assert? What should we make 
of proponents’ claims that a higher minimum wage will lead to 
a meaningful reduction in poverty? More broadly, is the over-
whelming popularity of the minimum wage among the Ameri-
can public justified by its impact on workers? 
Because the desirability of the minimum wage depends on 
its intended effects, this Article begins in Part I by examining 
the arguments that led to the enactment of the first minimum 
wage laws in the United States in the early 1900s and asks 
how the stated objectives of minimum wage policy have 
changed over time. This Article, which relies on economic 
theory and evidence from empirical research, then turns in 
Part II to the question of whether the minimum wage has been 
effective in achieving the economic and social benefits that its 
proponents have espoused. This Article concludes that the min-
imum wage has been ineffective in doing so, and then turns 
briefly in Part III to consider why the minimum wage enjoys 
such widespread support among policymakers and the public, 
despite the availability of labor market programs that are de-
monstrably more effective in aiding poor families. 
 
Apr. 15, 2008). 
 7. See, e.g., Jared Bernstein & Ross Eisenbrey, Raising the Minimum 
Wage to $7.25 Is an Important First Step (Econ. Policy Inst., EPI Policy Me-
morandum No. 118, Dec. 7, 2006), http://www.epi.org/content.cfm/pm118. 
 8. See, e.g., RICHARD VEDDER AND LOWELL GALLAWAY, SHOULD THE 
FEDERAL MINIMUM WAGE BE INCREASED? passim (Nat’l Ctr. for Policy Analy-
sis, NCPA Policy Report No. 190, Feb. 1995); Press Release, Employment Poli-
cies Inst., Minimum Wage Hike Threatens Healthy U.S. Economy (Dec. 1, 
2006), available at http://www.epionline.org/news_detail.cfm?rid=178. 
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I.  THE ORIGINS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE   
The first legislation establishing a minimum wage in the 
United States was enacted in Massachusetts in 1912.9 Other 
states soon followed, and by 1923, minimum wage laws were on 
the books in fifteen states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto 
Rico.10 The introduction of minimum wages in the United 
States, which followed similar laws that were already imple-
mented in Australia and New Zealand in the late 1800s, had 
roots in the labor reform movement led by groups like the Na-
tional Consumers League in the early 1900s.11 These minimum 
wage advocates were concerned about poor working conditions 
and low wages in a variety of manufacturing industries that 
employed low-skilled workers.12 Chief among their concerns 
was a belief that many workers were receiving a wage below 
what was necessary to provide them with an adequate stan-
dard of living.13 
In this context, advocates for minimum wages frequently 
argued that individuals had a moral right to a “living” wage, 
and that minimum wages were necessary to aid individuals 
who were worthy of such a wage, but who were unable to bar-
gain with their employers to obtain it.14 Opponents of minimum 
wages did not necessarily disagree with that rationale, but ar-
gued that laws requiring that workers be paid a wage higher 
than their productivity warranted would lead employers to re-
duce their staffing levels.15 Interestingly, some (although cer-
 
 9. See Clifford F. Thies, The First Minimum Wage Laws, 10 CATO J. 715, 
718 (1991). 
 10. Id. 
 11. See JEROLD WALTMAN, THE POLITICS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE 11 
(2000). 
 12. See id. 
 13. WILLIS J. NORDLUND, THE QUEST FOR A LIVING WAGE 2 (1997). 
 14. For example, Father John Ryan, a leading commentator on economic 
issues in the early 1900s, was a vocal proponent of this view. See Thies, supra 
note 9, at 721–22. 
 15. For example, in commenting on minimum wage proposals in the early 
1900s, John Bates Clark wrote, “A certain low minimum rate may be clearly 
and wholly legitimate; and moreover, prescribing even this rate may have a 
very important effect in ruling out some of the hardest practices that now pre-
vail.” John Bates Clark, The Minimum Wage, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1913, 
at 289, 292. However, he also argued that “[t]he rate that can be paid is li-
mited by the specific productivity of labor.” Id. at 290. Clark further argued 
that “[a] forcible raising of the rate of wages for workers of the lowest grade 
will lessen the number employed,” id. at 291, so that “[i]n rescuing workers 
who are suffering under the influence of an economic law, [the minimum 
wage] will forbid some of them to earn the living which they now get,” id. at 
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tainly not all) advocates of minimum wages acknowledged that 
wage floors would likely cause some of the lowest-skilled work-
ers to lose their jobs.16 But some of these advocates also be-
lieved that society as a whole would benefit when the lowest-
skilled workers, willing to accept very low wages, were replaced 
by higher-productivity workers to whom employers would turn 
in response to the minimum wage.17 Other proponents argued 
that a minimum wage would provide an incentive for low-
skilled workers to increase their effort or would “shock” busi-
nesses into reducing inefficiencies in other areas of their opera-
tions. Thus, businesses could absorb the higher labor costs as-
sociated with the minimum wage without reducing the size of 
their workforce.18 In effect, these proponents viewed higher 
productivity as a secondary benefit of a minimum wage. 
Because the balance of bargaining power between workers 
and employers was an important rationale for minimum wages 
in the early 1900s, the original minimum wage laws applied on-
ly to women and minors.19 The industries most identified with 
poor working conditions, such as clothing, candy-making, and 
box-making industries, tended to employ disproportionate 
numbers of women and youth, who were generally viewed at 
 
296. For additional (and opposing) perspectives on Clark’s view of the mini-
mum wage, see Thomas C. Leonard, “A Certain Rude Honesty:” John Bates 
Clark as a Pioneering Neoclassical Economist, 35 HIST. POL. ECON. 521, 524–
33 (2003); Robert E. Prasch, John Bates Clark’s Defense of Mandatory Arbitra-
tion and Minimum Wage Legislation, 22 J. HIST. ECON. THOUGHT 251, 251–63 
(2000).  
 16. See, e.g., Henry R. Seager, The Minimum Wage as Part of a Program 
for Social Reform, 48 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 3, 9–10 (1913) (ar-
guing that minimum wages would cause some of the least efficient and capa-
ble workers to be discharged, which would require additional social welfare 
programs). 
 17. See e.g., Leonard, supra note 15, at 527–28. Indeed, Thies characteriz-
es the early minimum wage movement  
as a rather odd coalition of Christian social reformers and utilitarian 
socialists. On the one hand, there were those who viewed minimum 
wages as part of their “preferential option” for the poor, and on the 
other hand, there were those who viewed minimum wages as a way to 
separate parasites from the mass of workers. 
Thies, supra note 9, at 742. 
 18. See, e.g., Sidney Webb, The Economic Theory of a Legal Minimum 
Wage, 20 J. POL. ECON. 973, 979–85 (1912). Webb also disagreed with Clark’s 
view that wages were determined by productivity and argued instead that 
wages for low-skilled workers were determined by the subsistence level of in-
come. Id. at 990.  
 19. See WOMEN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BULLETIN NO. 61: THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF MINIMUM-WAGE LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1912 TO 
1927, at 4–6 (1928). 
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the time as more likely than men to be subject to unfair labor 
practices.20 In contrast, many in society believed that men 
should be able to bargain on equal terms with employers con-
cerning the conditions of their employment, and thus that it 
would be “repugnant” for the government to regulate wages for 
men.21 Even so, courts often overturned minimum wage laws 
for women and minors on the grounds that they interfered with 
the rights of workers and employers to engage in voluntary 
contracts.22 Labor unions, such as the American Federation of 
Labor, also opposed these early minimum wage laws because of 
concerns that minimum wages would limit their role in collec-
tive bargaining.23 Reflecting the position of the courts and gen-
erally lukewarm support by powerful constituencies, state min-
imum wage laws declined in their prevalence and effectiveness 
over the course of the 1920s.24 
A different set of motivations initially stimulated the legis-
lation that established the federal minimum wage; “the fervent 
rhetoric about low[]wages and morals that occurred during the 
debate of the prior five decades was absent from this debate.”25 
Instead, minimum wages were proposed as a way of combating 
the extraordinarily high levels of unemployment during the 
Great Depression. In particular, many proponents argued that 
a minimum wage would raise household income levels and thus 
stimulate aggregate demand.26 Jason Taylor and George Selgin 
note that a number of economists in the 1920s advocated min-
imum wage laws as a way “to overcome the free-rider problem 
that discourages individual employers from paying high wage 
rates and thereby stimulating aggregate demand for goods and 
 
 20. WALTMAN, supra note 11, at 11–12. 
 21. WOMEN’S BUREAU, supra note 19, at 4. 
 22. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 544–61 (1923) 
(striking down a District of Columbia minimum wage statute on the grounds 
that it infringed on the freedom to contract), overruled by W. Coast Hotel v. 
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937). 
 23. NORDLUND, supra note 13, at 35. 
 24. In particular, courts found several state minimum wage laws uncons-
titutional after the Adkins decision, while other states’ legislatures either set 
minimum wages at low enough levels to be acceptable to employers or charac-
terized them as noncompulsory. Id. at 25. Thies notes that “[a]s of the end of 
the 1920s, of the 17 original minimum wage laws, five were either never en-
forced or were repealed, and seven were found unconstitutional . . . . The re-
maining laws were enforced with discretion.” Thies, supra note 9, at 717. 
 25. NORDLUND, supra note 13, at 32. 
 26. See WALTMAN, supra note 11, at 30; Jason Taylor & George Selgin, By 
Our Bootstraps: Origins and Effects of the High-Wage Doctrine and the Mini-
mum Wage, 20 J. LAB. RES. 447, 447 (1999). 
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services.”27 In addition, Taylor and Selgin cite the “Declaration 
of Policy” statement of the 1933 National Industrial Recovery 
Act (NIRA), which as part of its blanket code “established a 
minimum wage rate of $0.40 per hour . . . to ‘increase consump-
tion of industrial and agricultural products by increasing pur-
chasing power.’”28 Many economists would now dismiss this 
line of argument as wishful thinking and point out that conven-
tional economic theory suggests that higher real wages will 
tend to reduce aggregate output.29 But the “high-wage doc-
trine,” as it came to be known, was clearly quite popular among 
economists and politicians in the 1920s and 1930s.30 
Although the Supreme Court struck down the NIRA in 
1935, considerable support remained for a federal minimum 
wage.31 Many continued to couch their arguments on macro-
economic grounds, but proponents also began to appeal once 
more to the potential benefits of minimum wages for the poor. 
For example, President Franklin D. Roosevelt made a number 
of arguments along these lines, including his oft-cited state-
ment that “[o]ne-third of our population, the overwhelming ma-
jority of which is in agriculture or industry, is ill-nourished, ill-
clad, and ill-housed.”32 Opponents continued to express con-
cerns about the effects of a minimum wage on inflation and 
employment, especially in the South where wage rates were 
considerably lower.33 However, the proponents of a federal min-
imum eventually carried the day, and the FLSA, which estab-
lished a federal minimum wage of $0.25 per hour, was signed 
into law in 1938.34 
Support for the minimum wage as a means of raising pur-
chasing power continued into the early years of the FLSA. For 
example, the Truman administration viewed a higher mini-
mum wage as an insurance policy against another economic 
 
 27. Taylor & Selgin, supra note 26, at 454. 
 28. Id. at 457.  
 29. See id. at 447–49. 
 30. See id. at 450. Taylor and Selgin trace this popularity to Henry Ford’s 
high-wage policy and the concomitant success of the Ford Motor Company dur-
ing the 1920s, as well as to a widespread belief that the 1920–1921 depression 
was caused, at least in part, by a sharp decline in nominal wages. Id. at 450–
53. 
 31. Id. at 458. 
 32. 81 CONG. REC. 4960 (1937) (letter from President Roosevelt). 
 33. NORDLUND, supra note 13, at 39, 44. 
 34. For a short narrative of the events leading up to the passage of the 
FLSA, see Jonathan Grossman, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Maximum 
Struggle for a Minimum Wage, MONTHLY LAB. REV., June 1978, at 22, 22–30. 
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depression.35 Over time, however, the chief rationale for a 
higher minimum wage—as well as expansion of its coverage—
shifted toward its effects on the distribution of income, in par-
ticular the potential to provide additional income to low-wage 
workers and poor families.36 In 1960, according to Jerold Nord-
lund, “Senator [Hubert H.] Humphrey and many others argued 
the poverty reduction aspect of increases in coverage and in the 
minimum wage.”37 Similarly, extending coverage of the mini-
mum wage was one element of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s 
War on Poverty.38 However, many other politicians remained 
concerned about the effects of minimum wages on jobs and in-
flation.39 
Continuing this shift in the rhetoric, few advocates or op-
ponents of minimum wages now base their arguments on the 
potential effects of minimum wages on the macroeconomy.40 In-
stead, the debate over the minimum wage during the past two 
decades has shifted almost entirely to its potential effects on 
the economic well-being of low-skilled individuals and low-
income families.41 In particular, proponents of a higher mini-
mum wage typically cite the need for the minimum wage to be 
a living wage for the “working poor”;42 Senator Edward Kenne-
dy has referred to it as “one of the best . . . anti-poverty pro-
grams we have.”43 In contrast, opponents of minimum wages 
emphasize the potential for a higher minimum wage to cause 
job losses among young or low-skilled workers. These oppo-
nents also emphasize that many minimum wage workers are 
not from poor families but rather secondary workers (such as 
 
 35. WALTMAN, supra note 11, at 34 (quoting William S. White, Tobin 
Pushes Plan to Raise Pay Scale, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1949, at 4 (citing the 
statement of Maurice Tobin, Secretary of Labor, and William McComb, Ad-
ministrator of the Wage and Hour Division)). 
 36. See NORDLUND, supra note 13, at 100–01. 
 37. Id. at 101. 
 38. Id. at 110. 
 39. Id. at 117. 
 40. See Daniel B. Klein & Stewart Dompe, Reasons for Supporting the 
Minimum Wage: Asking the Signatories of the “Raise the Minimum Wage” 
Statement, 4 ECON. J. WATCH 125, 143 (2007) (noting that only three of ninety-
five economists on the record as supporting a raise in the minimum wage list 
macroeconomic effects as a key rationale for their support). 
 41. Oren M. Levin-Waldman, The Rhetorical Evolution of the Minimum 
Wage, 3 RHETORIC & PUB. AFF. 131, 142–48 (2000). 
 42. See, e.g., id. at 133. 
 43. ADAM CLYMER, EDWARD M. KENNEDY: A BIOGRAPHY 449 (1999) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). 
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teenagers) in higher-income families; as a result, they argue 
that minimum wages are unlikely to help the poor and may 
harm them.44 Given the current focus of the debate, we turn 
next to the effects of minimum wages on employment and the 
distribution of family income.  
II.  HAS THE MINIMUM WAGE BEEN AN EFFECTIVE 
POLICY TOOL?   
Economic research on the minimum wage dates back at 
least as far as its use as an economic policy.45 Indeed, early 
studies of minimum wages, although mostly theoretical in na-
ture, highlighted many of the same issues that are at the heart 
of the current policy debate: the appropriate role of the mar-
ketplace in determining wages;46 the relationships between 
wages, prices, and productivity;47 and the extent to which gov-
ernment can influence the distribution of income by interven-
ing in labor markets.48 In this Part, we examine what we have 
learned about the effects of minimum wages from economic re-
search—from both a theoretical and empirical standpoint. We 
begin in Part II.A with a discussion of the predictions derived 
from alternative theories of the minimum wage. Part II.B then 
turns to an examination of the empirical evidence on the effects 
of minimum wages on employment and incomes.49  
A. WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM ECONOMIC THEORY? 
The traditional textbook model used to describe the effects 
of minimum wages on labor and product markets is neoclassi-
cal in nature, and the predictions from this model are relatively 
straightforward: In an economy with competitive labor and 
product markets and homogenous workers, a broad-based in-
crease in the minimum wage to a level higher than the market 
 
 44. See, e.g., Richard V. Burkhauser & Joseph J. Sabia, The Effectiveness 
of Minimum-Wage Increases in Reducing Poverty: Past, Present, and Future, 
25 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 262, 276–77 (2007). 
 45. See Thomas C. Leonard, The Very Idea of Applying Economics: The 
Modern Minimum-Wage Controversy and Its Antecedents, 32 HIST. POL. ECON. 
117, 122 (2000). 
 46. See id. 
 47. See id. at 124–26. 
 48. See id. at 123–24. 
 49. A much more detailed discussion of the theoretical arguments and 
empirical evidence is provided in DAVID NEUMARK & WILLIAM WASCHER, 
MINIMUM WAGES (forthcoming) (manuscript at 54−113, 199−271, on file with 
the Minnesota Law Review).  
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wage leads to a decline in employment and, because of the 
higher cost of labor, an increase in prices.50 However, the mag-
nitude of job loss depends importantly on the nature of the pro-
duction process—in particular, the extent to which employers 
can substitute capital for labor in response to the higher mini-
mum wage—and on the sensitivity of product demand to the 
higher price.51 As a result, the number of workers who will lose 
their jobs in response to an increase in the minimum wage will 
depend on the elasticity of demand for labor.52 
Moreover, this representation of the labor market is surely 
too simplistic, and relaxing some of the assumptions that un-
derlie the textbook model considerably complicates the deduc-
tions that can be drawn from it. To give one particularly rele-
vant example, we can extend the model to allow for the 
possibility that each firm employs workers with a range of skill 
levels.53 In this case, a higher minimum wage causes employers 
to substitute away from the lowest-skilled workers not only to-
ward capital, but also toward workers with greater skills.54 As 
a result, the magnitude of the effect of a minimum wage in-
crease on aggregate employment is smaller than in the simple 
model (although overall employment almost surely falls). Per-
haps more importantly, the distributional effects are noticeably 
different.55 In particular, in this version of the model, higher-
skilled workers benefit from the higher minimum wage because 
it increases the demand for their services.56 In contrast, em-
ployment opportunities for the lowest-skilled workers are even 
more adversely affected.57 
A second interesting variation extends the model to allow 
for the possibility that consumers substitute between closely 
related products in response to changes in relative prices.58 
This version of the model is relevant to an analysis of the min-
imum wage because such product substitution could cause the 
employment effects of a higher minimum to differ considerably 
 
 50. See, e.g., Charles Brown et al., The Effect of the Minimum Wage on 
Employment and Unemployment, 20 J. ECON. LITERATURE 487, 488–89 (1982). 
 51. Id. at 488. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See id. at 493–95. 
 54. See id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 495. 
 58. See NEUMARK & WASCHER, supra note 49 (manuscript at 58–59). 
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across industries.59 Welch illustrates this point using two types 
of restaurants that are close substitutes in consumption (ethnic 
restaurants vs. fast food restaurants), but that differ in their 
factor intensities of low-wage labor.60 An increase in the mini-
mum wage will tend to cause larger price increases at the res-
taurants where low-wage labor is a higher share of total costs 
because the higher minimum wage will have a larger impact on 
those firms’ production costs.61 If consumers respond to this 
relative price change by shifting their demand toward the res-
taurants with smaller price increases, employment at the res-
taurants that employ fewer low-wage workers will fall by less—
and could actually rise—in response to the increase in the min-
imum wage, while job losses would be that much greater at the 
low-wage intensive restaurants.62 
A third—and more fundamental—deviation from the neo-
classical model is to assume that labor markets are not compet-
itive, but rather that employers have some market power over 
wages.63 The simplest model along these lines assumes that 
there is pure monopsony power characterized by a single em-
ployer facing an upward-sloping labor supply schedule.64 As 
Robinson has shown, the equilibrium wage and level of em-
ployment in this model are below those in the competitive mod-
el, so that an increase in the minimum wage can lead to an in-
crease in both wages and employment.65  
Although few believe that the single-employer monopsony 
model is relevant for today’s low-wage labor markets,66 a num-
ber of economists have proposed theoretical models that lead to 
monopsony-like implications in markets with multiple profit-
maximizing employers. For example, some researchers have 
noted that differences in nonpecuniary attributes across firms 
(such as location or work schedules) can produce behavior con-
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Finis Welch, Comment, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 842, 847 (1995) 
(reviewing DAVID CARD & ALAN B. KRUEGER, MYTH AND MEASUREMENT: THE 
NEW ECONOMICS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE (1995)). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id.  
 63. See Brown et al., supra note 50, at 489. 
 64. JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 293–
95 (1933); Brown et al., supra note 50, at 489. 
 65. See ROBINSON, supra note 64, at 295. 
 66. Charles Brown, Minimum Wages, Employment, and the Distribution 
of Income, in 3 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 2101, 2108–09 (Orley Ashen-
felter & David Card eds., 1999). 
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sistent with monopsony.67 Other researchers have developed 
monopsony models based on linkages between wages and work-
er effort,68 complex compensation schedules,69 or search fric-
tions.70 Effectively, any model that assumes a marginal cost of 
labor schedule that is steeper than the labor supply curve will 
lead to the prediction that, over some range, a minimum wage 
could raise employment toward the level that would result in a 
competitive equilibrium.71 
However, there are two notable shortcomings of models 
based on monopsony power. First, the range in such models 
over which the minimum wage increases employment is likely 
to be relatively narrow because it includes only the portion of 
the labor supply curve between the monopsonistic equilibrium 
wage and the competitive equilibrium wage.72 Once the mini-
mum wage rises above the latter, further increases in the wage 
floor will, as in the competitive model, reduce labor demand 
and, thus, employment.73 Because this implies that the mini-
mum wage that increases employment would vary by firm and 
occupation, Stigler dismissed this model as “not very relevant 
to the question of a national minimum wage,” and also argued 
that it “would be impossibly difficult to devise and revise” a set 
of optimal minimum wages.74 From an empirical standpoint, we 
looked for evidence of an identifiable monopsony region in state 
labor markets and found no evidence that such a range was 
economically important in any state, although we could not rule 
out the possibility that monopsony behavior may characterize 
the relationship between the minimum wage and employment 
over a narrow range of the minimum wage.75  
 
 67. See V. Bhaskar & Ted To, Minimum Wages for Ronald McDonald Mo-
nopsonies: A Theory of Monopsonistic Competition, 109 ECON. J. 190 passim 
(1999); Richard Dickens et al., The Effects of Minimum Wages on Employment: 
Theory and Evidence from Britain, 17 J. LAB. ECON. 1 passim (1999). 
 68. James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, The Consequences of Minimum 
Wage Laws: Some New Theoretical Ideas, 56 J. PUB. ECON. 245 (1995). 
 69. Walter John Wessels, Minimum Wages and Tipped Servers, 35 ECON. 
INQUIRY 334 (1997). 
 70. Kenneth Burdett & Dale T. Mortensen, Wage Differentials, Employer 
Size, and Unemployment, 39 INT’L ECON. REV. 257 (1998). 
 71. See NEUMARK & WASCHER, supra note 49 (manuscript at 60–61). 
 72. See id.; George J. Stigler, The Economics of Minimum Wage Legisla-
tion, 36 AM. ECON. REV. 358, 360–61 (1946). 
 73. See NEUMARK & WASCHER, supra note 49 (manuscript at 60–61); Stig-
ler, supra note 72, at 360–61. 
 74. See Stigler, supra note 72, at 360, 361 n.3. 
 75. David Neumark & William Wascher, State-Level Estimates of Mini-
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Second, a standard feature of models with monopsony pow-
er is their prediction that an increase in the minimum wage 
will lead to a reduction in prices.76 This result occurs because 
the higher level of employment predicted by such models also 
implies an increase in production, which, absent a change in 
demand, will put downward pressure on output prices.77 In con-
trast to this prediction of monopsony, the evidence almost un-
iformly indicates that minimum wages raise prices in indus-
tries that employ sizable numbers of low-wage workers.78 As a 
result, monopsony models, although theoretically possible, do 
not seem like good candidates with which to assess the effects 
of minimum wages. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly given the current 
rhetoric, none of the theoretical models in the literature provide 
a clear prediction about the effects of the minimum wage on the 
incomes of the poor—the main societal goal of minimum wages. 
From the standpoint of the competitive model, Richard Free-
man notes that “[m]inimum wages do not increase the pay of 
workers by magic . . . but rather take money from some citizens 
and pay it to others.”79 Because individuals potentially affected 
by the minimum wage may range from teenagers in well-off 
families to heads of poor families, the distributional question 
becomes: who are the winners and who are the losers from an 
increase in the minimum wage?80  
More specifically, the distributional effects of a higher min-
imum wage will depend on where the affected individuals are 
located in the income distribution, a question that economic 
 
mum Wage Effects: New Evidence and Interpretations from Disequilibrium 
Models, 37 J. HUM. RESOURCES 35, 47–48 (2002). 
 76. See Daniel Aaronson & Eric French, Product Market Evidence on the 
Employment Effects of the Minimum Wage, 27 J. LAB. ECON. 167, 169 (2007). 
 77. See id. at 174–78. 
 78. Daniel Aaronson and James MacDonald, for example, consistently 
find evidence that minimum wages raise prices in the restaurant industry. See 
Daniel Aaronson, Price Pass-Through and the Minimum Wage, 83 REV. ECON. 
& STAT. 158, 169 (2001); James M. MacDonald & Daniel Aaronson, How Firms 
Construct Price Changes: Evidence from Restaurant Responses to Increased 
Minimum Wages, 88 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 292, 306 (2006). More broadly, Sara 
Lemos surveys the literature in this area and concludes that the minimum 
wage raises prices but not “by too much.” Sara Lemos, A Survey of the Effects 
of the Minimum Wage on Prices, 22 J. ECON. SURV. 187, 208 (2008). In particu-
lar, she concludes that “a 10% US minimum wage increase raises food prices 
by no more than 4% and overall prices by no more than 0.4%.” Id. 
 79. Richard B. Freeman, The Minimum Wage as a Redistributive Tool, 
106 ECON. J. 639, 640 (1996). 
 80. See id. at 640–42. 
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theory is not well equipped to answer. Although some econo-
mists have attempted to tackle this question using simulation 
methods,81 such simulations are dependent on assumptions 
about the values of numerous parameters in the model, many 
of which are not easily calibrated from the existing evidence.82 
As a result, in our view, the effect of the minimum wage on the 
family income distribution is best assessed by looking at the 
empirical evidence directly. 
In summary, theoretical models of the labor market yield a 
variety of predictions about the effect of the minimum wage on 
the demand for low-skilled workers and about how that effect 
may vary across workers and labor markets. In the competitive 
model of labor markets, prices rise and employment most often 
declines in response to a higher minimum wage, but this pre-
diction does not necessarily hold in all markets narrowly de-
fined and for all types of low-wage labor. Moreover, even in cas-
es where the predictions of the model are clearly for negative 
employment effects, the magnitude of job loss depends impor-
tantly on a variety of parameters in the model. In addition, 
other models in which employers have some market power in 
wage-setting can yield strikingly different predictions from 
those in the competitive model, with increases in employment 
and output and a decline in prices. Finally, the theoretical 
models discussed in this Section tell us little about how the ef-
fects of minimum wages are spread across families with differ-
ent income levels because they do not explicitly identify the 
winners and losers associated with a higher minimum wage. As 
a result, empirical evidence is needed to assess the effects of 
minimum wages and, in particular, whether minimum wage 
policy meets the oft-stated objective of raising the incomes of 
poor families.  
 
 81. See, e.g., Richard V. Burkhauser et al., “Who Gets What” from Mini-
mum Wage Hikes: A Re-Estimation of Card and Krueger’s Distributional Anal-
ysis in Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the Minimum Wage, 
49 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 547, 550–52 (1996); Michael W. Horrigan & Ro-
nald B. Mincy, The Minimum Wage and Earnings and Income Inequality, in 
UNEVEN TIDES: RISING INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 251, 254–74 (Sheldon Danzig-
er & Peter Gottschalk eds., 1993). 
 82. See, e.g., Burkhauser et al., supra note 81, at 550–51 (illustrating the 
number of assumptions required to simulate the distributional effects of in-
creasing the minimum wage). 
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B. WHAT DO THE DATA SHOW? 
Empirical research on the economic effects of minimum 
wages has been quite contentious, especially in recent years.83 
A vast majority of the research has focused on employment ef-
fects.84 Given the current political rhetoric surrounding mini-
mum wages, we argue below that this is only part of the story—
the impact of the minimum wage on the level and distribution 
of family incomes is also important. However, the evidence of 
the effects of minimum wages on employment is a useful place 
to begin the discussion of the empirical literature.  
1. Employment 
Although some empirical case studies were published in 
the years following the introduction of state minimum wages in 
the early 1910s and 1920s,85 and then again after the federal 
minimum wage was enacted in 1938,86 a much larger body of 
research on the employment effects of the minimum wage was 
conducted in the 1970s.87 This research focused on the effects of 
the federal minimum wage, and was comprised mostly of time-
series studies.88 The most widely cited survey of this literature 
concluded that the evidence pointed to “a reduction of between 
one and three percent in teenage employment as a result of a 
10 percent increase in the federal minimum wage.”89 As a re-
sult of this research, the view that an increase in the minimum 
wage would lead to a decline in the employment of youth and 
other low-skilled workers was clearly the consensus of econo-
mists in the 1980s.90  
 
 83. Robert Whaples, Do Economists Agree on Anything? Yes!, 
ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, Nov. 2006, at 1, 4, http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol3/iss9/ 
art1 (highlighting the division among economists on the issue of minimum 
wages). 
 84. David Neumark & William L. Wascher, Minimum Wages and Em-
ployment, 3 FOUND. & TRENDS IN MICROECONOMICS 1, 5 (2007). 
 85. See Thies, supra note 9, at 735–39 (providing a historical background 
of research on minimum wage laws). 
 86. See John M. Peterson, Employment Effects of Minimum Wages: 1938–
50, 65 J. POL. ECON. 412, 415–16 (1957) (describing Department of Labor stu-
dies). 
 87. NORDLUND, supra note 13, at 143–44. 
 88. Ronald G. Ehrenberg, New Minimum Wage Research: Symposium In-
troduction, 46 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3, 3 (1992). 
 89. Brown et al., supra note 50, at 508. 
 90. For example, one study found that only about twenty percent of econ-
omists surveyed in 1990 disagreed with the statement that “[a] minimum 
wage increases unemployment among young and unskilled workers.” Richard 
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Given this consensus and the absence of new policy varia-
tion with which to examine the issue (the federal minimum 
wage was unchanged between 1981 and 1990), few researchers 
studied the minimum wage through the remainder of that dec-
ade. The decline in the real value of the federal minimum dur-
ing the 1980s, however, eventually returned the topic of mini-
mum wages to the spotlight and led a number of states to raise 
their minimum wages above the federal level.91 These state-
level increases, coupled with the passage of the Fair Labor 
Standards Amendments of 1989,92 provided economists with 
additional “experiments” with which to reexamine the costs and 
benefits of minimum wages.93 
This more recent research produced considerably more di-
verse results. Perhaps the best-known studies were conducted 
by David Card and Alan Krueger and summarized in their 
1995 book Myth and Measurement, which argued against the 
consensus view of minimum wage effects.94 However, the com-
plete body of research includes more than one hundred studies 
on the employment effects alone, and encompasses an impres-
sive variety of statistical techniques and datasets, including 
more sophisticated time-series analyses, case studies of par-
ticular minimum wage increases, and panel studies across 
states and years.95  
Because of the wide range of results in studies conducted 
over the past two decades, we recently undertook a careful and 
exhaustive review of this research.96 Despite numerous claims 
that the recent research fails to support the traditional view 
that the minimum wage reduces employment,97 our survey in-
 
M. Alston et al., Is There a Consensus Among Economists in the 1990’s?, 82 
AM. ECON. REV. 203, 204 (1992). 
 91. See Brown, supra note 66, at 2122. 
 92. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-157, 103 
Stat. 938 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). 
 93. Ehrenberg, supra note 88, at 3–4. 
 94. CARD & KRUEGER, supra note 60, at 1 (“This book presents a new body 
of evidence showing that recent minimum-wage increases have not had the 
negative employment effects predicted by the textbook model.”). 
 95. Neumark & Wascher, supra note 84, at 5. 
 96. See id at 5–7. 
 97. See, e.g., JEFF CHAPMAN, EMPLOYMENT AND THE MINIMUM WAGE: 
EVIDENCE FROM RECENT STATE LABOR MARKET TRENDS 2 (Econ. Policy Inst., 
Briefing Paper No. 150, 2004), available at http://www.epi.org/briefingpapers/ 
150/bp150.pdf (asserting that recent studies conclude that minimum wage 
laws do not cause many low-wage workers to lose their jobs); Stephen Bazen, 
The Impact of the Regulation of Low Wages on Inequality and Labour-Market 
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dicates that the bulk of the research conducted in the past two 
decades finds negative employment effects for low-skilled 
workers. In particular, about two-thirds of the studies in our 
survey, and more than eighty percent of the studies we view as 
most credible, give a consistent indication of negative employ-
ment effects. In contrast, only eight studies consistently find a 
positive effect of the minimum wage on employment, and most 
of these were case studies of the effects of a specific minimum 
wage increase on employment in a narrowly defined industry.98  
Moreover, the evidence for negative employment effects is 
especially strong for the least-skilled groups of workers across 
all industries and in studies that allow for minimum wages to 
affect employment with a lag.99 Thus, when researchers focus 
on broad groups of individuals most likely to be affected by the 
minimum wage and allow sufficient time for policy changes to 
affect the labor market, the evidence for disemployment effects 
seems overwhelming. 
2. Family Incomes 
As noted above, however, the effects on employment are 
only one aspect of the economic implications of minimum wag-
es, and the conclusion that a wage floor reduces employment 
opportunities for low-skilled individuals does not necessarily 
imply that the minimum wage is bad policy. Who earns the 
minimum wage and how they are affected are just as impor-
tant. For example, if the negative employment effects tend to 
be concentrated among teenagers from middle-income families 
and the benefits are more broadly distributed among low-wage 
workers, a higher minimum wage might be an effective means 
of raising the income levels of poor families. On the other hand, 
if the job losses associated with a minimum wage are concen-
trated among workers from poor families, an increase in the 
minimum wage could have adverse effects on the distribution of 
family incomes. 
As a starting point for addressing this question, some re-
searchers provided evidence on the characteristics of workers 
who earn the minimum wage. In particular, Burkhauser and 
 
Adjustment: A Comparative Analysis, OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y, Summer 
2000, at 57, 64 (claiming that, despite assertions that minimum wage laws are 
a major cause of unemployment, studies from the 1990s found little or no evi-
dence of negative effects on employment). 
 98. Neumark & Wascher, supra note 84, at 164. 
 99. Id. at 164–65. 
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colleagues note that only about one-third of the workers direct-
ly affected by the 1990 federal minimum wage increase lived in 
poor or near-poor families, and that about the same proportion 
of minimum wage workers lived in families with incomes more 
than three times the poverty line.100 This result primarily re-
flects the fact that many minimum wage workers are secondary 
earners; in 2006, for example, sixty percent of workers earning 
the federal minimum wage were younger than twenty-five 
years old and forty percent were teenagers.101 The tendency for 
many minimum wage workers to be secondary earners, perhaps 
from middle-income households, implies that a considerable 
portion of the additional earnings associated with a higher min-
imum wage could go to nonpoor families, although this ulti-
mately depends on who bears the employment losses.  
More direct evidence pertaining to the effects that mini-
mum wages have on the distribution of income establishes that 
minimum wages do not help poor or near-poor families. In our 
own work, for example, we find no evidence that a higher min-
imum wage reduces the number of poor and near-poor families. 
Any tendency for a higher minimum to lift some families out of 
poverty is more than offset by an increased likelihood that the 
reduction in work hours or employment associated with the 
higher minimum will cause some nonpoor families to fall into 
poverty.102 Similarly, another recent study concludes that there 
is “no evidence that increases in the minimum wage reduced 
poverty rates among workers or even among working single 
mothers over the period 1988−2003.”103  
The past research also indicates that the minimum wage is 
an especially weak antipoverty tool when compared to other la-
bor market policies. In particular, the earned income tax credit 
has been shown to be much more effective than the minimum 
wage in raising the incomes of poor families, mainly because it 
is much better targeted.104 Finally, in the longer-run, policies 
 
 100. Burkhauser et al., supra note 81, at 551. 
 101. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 5, at tbl.1. 
 102. David Neumark & William Wascher, Do Minimum Wages Fight Pover-
ty?, 40 ECON. INQUIRY 315, 332 (2002); David Neumark et al., The Effects of 
Minimum Wages on the Distribution of Family Incomes: A Nonparametric 
Analysis, 40 J. HUM. RESOURCES 867, 889 (2005). 
 103. Burkhauser & Sabia, supra note 44, at 276. 
 104. Jeffrey Grogger, The Effects of Time Limits, the EITC, and Other Poli-
cy Changes on Welfare Use, Work, and Income Among Female-Headed Fami-
lies, 85 REV. ECON. & STAT. 394, 408 (2003); David Neumark & William 
Wascher, Using the EITC to Help Poor Families: New Evidence and a Compar-
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aimed at increasing the productivity of workers by improving 
their education and training would seem likely to be more ef-
fective than the minimum wage at raising living standards.105 
In summary, the data do not seem to support the rationale 
typically cited for increases in the minimum wage. Although a 
modestly higher minimum wage would not entail large-scale 
job losses for the economy as a whole, the evidence clearly indi-
cates that minimum wages reduce job opportunities for the 
lowest-skilled workers, who are the intended beneficiaries of 
minimum wages. More fundamentally, there is little evidence 
that a higher minimum wage is helpful in addressing the plight 
of poor families. 
III.  WHY ARE MINIMUM WAGES SO POPULAR?   
Despite the evidence that minimum wages are an ineffec-
tive means of reducing poverty, they enjoy widespread support. 
In a recent poll taken in 2006, more than eighty percent of res-
pondents indicated that they would support an increase in the 
minimum wage from $5.15 per hour to $7.15 per hour.106 In 
contrast, economists are considerably more divided on the is-
sue: according to a 2005 survey, thirty-eight percent supported 
an increase in the minimum wage, while forty-seven percent 
thought that it should be eliminated altogether.107 
As noted above, minimum wage laws generally help some 
individuals and hurt others. In this context, one reason for 
their popular support may be that the benefits of minimum 
wages are more directly observable—and spread more widely—
than the costs. For example, even if a one percent increase in 
the minimum wage leads to a two percent decline in the em-
ployment of minimum wage workers (or an elasticity of −2), a 
ten percent increase in the wage floor will help eighty percent 
of minimum wage workers and harm only twenty percent (al-
 
ison with the Minimum Wage, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 281, 315 (2001); Ximing Wu et 
al., Effects of Government Policies on Income Distribution and Welfare 23 (Inst. 
for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper No. iirwps-086-02, 
2002), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 
1023&context=iir. 
 105. Indeed, some evidence suggests that minimum wages have negative 
effects on skill acquisition. See, e.g., NEUMARK & WASCHER, supra note 49 
(manuscript at 313–14). 
 106. For the results of the poll administered by the Pew Research Center, 
see Larry M. Bartels, A Tale of Two Tax Cuts, a Wage Squeeze, and a Tax Cre-
dit, 59 NAT’L TAX J. 403, 416 (2006). 
 107. Whaples, supra note 83, at 4. 
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though the wages lost by those twenty percent will be consider-
ably larger than the additional wages received by those who 
remain employed).108 Moreover, the job losses associated with 
minimum wages are often manifested as a reduction in hiring 
rather than an increase in layoffs. As a result, it can be difficult 
to identify those individuals without a job who would have ob-
tained one in the absence of a higher minimum wage.109 Taken 
together, these factors suggest that at least some supporters of 
minimum wages may not fully comprehend their effects. 
Second, it can be in the self-interest of certain constituent 
groups to support minimum wages even if the members of 
those groups do not benefit directly from the minimum wage. 
For example, unionized workers may benefit indirectly from a 
minimum wage increase if that increase induces substitution 
away from low-skilled nonunion workers toward higher-skilled 
unionized workers, a result consistent with some empirical evi-
dence.110 Accordingly, unions solely interested in the welfare of 
their members will have an incentive to support higher mini-
mum wages even if no union worker is paid the minimum 
wage.111 Likewise, for an employer already paying its workers 
above the minimum wage (or who is able to offset a higher min-
imum wage by reducing other parts of the compensation pack-
age), a higher wage floor that increases the costs of its low-
wage competitors will put upward pressure on its competitors’ 
prices and thus shift demand toward the higher-wage firm, in-
 
 108. Although an elasticity of −2 for minimum wage workers may appear to 
be much larger than the −0.1 to −0.2 estimates reported in the literature for 
teenagers, these figures are not directly comparable. In particular, an estimate 
of the impact of the minimum wage on total employment for teenagers is the 
effect on the teenagers who are directly affected by the minimum wage aver-
aged over all teenagers. Moreover, the average increase in wages received by 
the directly affected workers will be smaller than the minimum wage increase 
if some workers were already earning a wage between the old and new mini-
mum wage. For further details, see Neumark & Wascher, supra note 102, at 
317. 
 109. See Charles Brown, Minimum Wage Laws: Are They Overrated?, J. 
ECON. PERSP., Summer 1998, at 133, 134–35; David Neumark & William 
Wascher, The Effects of Minimum Wages on Teenage Employment and 
Enrollment: Evidence from Matched CPS Surveys, in 15 RESEARCH IN LABOR 
ECONOMICS 25, 43–45 (Solomon W. Polachek ed., 1996). 
 110. David Neumark et al., Minimum Wage Effects Throughout the Wage 
Distribution, 39 J. HUM. RESOURCES 425, 427 (2004); David Neumark et al., 
The Effects of Minimum Wages Throughout the Wage Distribution 25–26 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7519, 2000), available at http:// 
www.nber.org/papers/w7519.pdf.  
 111. James C. Cox & Ronald L. Oaxaca, The Political Economy of Mini-
mum Wage Legislation, 20 ECON. INQUIRY 533, 542–43 (1982). 
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creasing its profits.112 As an historical example, in the discus-
sions leading up to the passage of the FLSA, northern indu-
strialists broadly supported enacting a federal minimum wage, 
a fact many attributed to a view among these industrialists 
that the low wages paid in southern states provided employers 
in those states with an unfair competitive advantage.113 In a 
similar vein, some observers attribute the recent support for a 
higher minimum wage from some large retailers to an expecta-
tion that the higher minimum will adversely affect their small-
er competitors.114  
Finally, some supporters of a higher minimum wage may 
see the policy as targeting objectives other than (or in addition 
to) those related specifically to the effects of minimum wages on 
the income distribution. If so, those supporters may be willing 
to tolerate the inefficiencies of wage floors in pursuit of these 
objectives. As argued earlier, the current rhetoric primarily 
emphasizes the effects of minimum wages on the working poor. 
However, there are proponents who appeal to issues of morality 
or fairness (in some cases, along the lines espoused by early 
supporters that there is unequal bargaining power between 
employers and workers).115 Alternatively, other proponents ar-
gue that the minimum wage is a means of coordinating appro-
priate wage levels across markets with limited information, or 
that it can serve as a broader signal of societal concerns about 
increasing income inequality and a decline in the political pow-
er of workers.116  
  CONCLUSION   
This Article asks whether the actual effects of minimum 
wages are consistent with statements made by many advocates 
and opponents of minimum wages. For the most extreme 
statements, the answer is no. An increase in the minimum 
 
 112. See William R. Keech, More on the Vote Winning and Vote Losing 
Qualities of Minimum Wage Laws, 29 PUB. CHOICE 133, 134 (1977). 
 113. NORDLUND, supra note 13, at 39. 
 114. Tim Kane, Wal-Mart’s Perverse Strategy on the Minimum Wage (The 
Heritage Foundation, WebMemo No. 899, Oct. 28, 2005), http://www.heritage 
.org/Research/Labor/wm899.cfm. 
 115. See e.g., Klein & Dompe, supra note 40, at 126, 145–48 (providing ex-
amples of individuals’ perceptions of the sociopolitical benefits of minimum 
wage policies). 
 116. See id. at 140–41 (describing the results of a minimum wage ques-
tionnaire distributed among economists supporting an increase in the mini-
mum wage). 
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wage of modest proportions is unlikely to have important ma-
croeconomic effects, and, in particular, is unlikely to lead to 
sizable job losses in the aggregate. On the other hand, there is 
little evidence of the benefits often attributed to the minimum 
wage by its proponents.  
So, what does the minimum wage do? As discussed, eco-
nomic theory is only of limited value in assessing the effects of 
the minimum wage. Although conventional economic models 
generally predict that a higher wage floor will lead to job losses 
for low-skilled workers, the neoclassical model is not specific 
about the precise nature or the magnitude of those job losses. 
Moreover, other models that assume some monopsony power on 
the part of employers suggest that the minimum wage might 
even raise employment.  
As a result, it is more informative to assess the effects of 
minimum wages with empirical research. From that stand-
point, the evidence thus far has failed to establish that the min-
imum wage is an effective means of helping the poor—which is 
arguably the primary policy goal of minimum wage laws. In 
particular, the balance of the evidence indicates that, even if its 
aggregate effects are relatively small, a higher minimum wage 
will reduce job opportunities for the least-skilled workers most 
likely to be affected by the wage floor and, for some groups of 
workers, those disemployment effects could be substantial. In 
addition, the available evidence suggests that the minimum 
wage does not benefit the distribution of family incomes.  
Finally, this Article asks why minimum wages are so popu-
lar when the evidence provides little reason to support them. 
Several possibilities were proposed—including the difficulty in 
identifying individuals who are harmed by the minimum wage 
and the motivation for certain groups of higher-skilled workers 
or larger businesses to support them on self-interest grounds. 
Additionally, some advocates of minimum wages may support 
minimum wage laws for reasons not directly related to their ef-
fects on the economic outcomes we have considered. Whether 
fairness or other noneconomic considerations are valid reasons 
for supporting the minimum wage is beyond the scope of this 
Article. However, the existing research provides little evidence 
that the minimum wage is an effective antipoverty program. 
From that standpoint, future expansions of the earned income 
tax credit (at both the federal and state level) and efforts to 
create programs aimed at increasing job skills have a greater 
potential to help the poor. 
